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TAXATION OF COSTS IN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS
Richard C. Peck*
I. INTRODUCTION
It logically seems that any problems involved in taxation of
costs should be primarily mechanical in nature and ought not
be of such significance as to warrant consideration beyond mere
recognition of their existence. This is a false premise, however,
for it is a common experience that the mechanics of'a procedure
can often be as troublesome to the practitioner as is a substantive
issue.
In any event, to those whose business it is to nurture the
orderly administration of the federal judicial processes, it has become increasingly apparent that for many litigants the course to
be followed in the resolution of this phase of the lawsuit is often
fraught with 'aggravating uncertainty. Some confusion exists because the procedure for determining the issue of costs taxable and
recoverable in federal litigation differs considerably from that to
which practitioners are accustomed in state court proceedings.
Beyond this, there is always a temptation not to become sufficiently
knowledgeable of and to anticipate the impact of the ultimate issue
of costs during that time in which the litigation is grinding its fitful
but inexorable way toward an Wltimate conclusion. Costs thus,
oftentimes at the twilight hour of the lawsuit, become a surprise
issue, consuming too much time in their resolution, and possessing
a pesky tendency to invite conflict well out of proportion to the
main issues of the original controversy.
In some instances, a still more cogent reason to be alert to the
issue of costs is that the ever increasing costliness of today's
litigation has caused the "incidental" of yesterday to become a
'matter of some consequence. Fair witness to this point is a case
in the Eighth Circuit, tried before the District Court for the Western
District of Missouri,1 in which taxation of ordinary costs in the
total sum of $13,981.76 was sought and in which an allowance of
*A.B., 1941, LL.B., 1942, Univ. of Neb.; former assistant U.S. attorney, Neb.
Dist.; presently clerk of the U.S. Dist. Ct., Neb. Dist.; member of the
American, Federal, Nebraska, and Omaha Bar Ass'ns.
'Brookside Theatre Corp. v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., .11 F.R.D.
259 (W.D. Mo. 1951), afi'd & modified, 194 F.2d 846 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 343 U.S. 942 (1952).
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$7,987.09 was eventually made. In addition attorney's fees in the
amount of $150,000 were taxed as costs in the trial court, but on
appeal they were reduced to $100,000.
A consideration of some of the practical aspects of this "incidental" item may, therefore, be of some value to all practitioners,
be] they so-called regulars in the federal forum, or be they among
those who are concerned only occasionally with such litigation.
II. THE PROCEDURES INVOLVED
of Rule 54(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil
The first sentence
2
Procedure provides:
Except when express provision therefor is made either in a statute
of the United States or in these rules, costs shall be allowed as of
course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs;
but costs against the United States, its officers, and agencies shall
be imposed only to the extent permitted by law.
The following direction appears in Rule 58: "The '3entry of the
judgment shall not be delayed for the taxing of costs."
Accordingly, in the ordinary circumstance when judgment is entered it will be silent as to the exact amount of costs to be recovered
by the prevailing party. It may simply direct that -the prevailing
party recover judgment in a specific amount plus "costs" or "costs
to .be taxed" or "costs taxable" or some similar recitation. Thus,
the latent issue of costs to be ultimately included in the judgment
usually remains for disposition after entry of judgment.The procedural starting point for resolution of this issue is the
second sentence of Rule 54 (d) stating: "Costs may be taxed by the
clerk on one day's notice."4
While this is permissive language which in no way withdraws
the court's inherent power to tax costs,5 customarily, and pursuant
to the rule, costs are taxed in the first instance by the clerk rather
than by the judge.0 In the District of Nebraska the practice is fixed
by Local Rule 28 (a) as follows: 7
The party entitled to recover costs shall file a verified bill of costs
upon forms provided by the Clerk. The date on which the party
2

FED.R.

Civ. P. 54(d).
8FED. R. Civ. P. 58.
R. Civ. P. 54(d).
fDeering, Milliken & Co. v. Temp-Resisto Corp., 169 F. Supp. 453 (S.D.N.Y.
1959).
6Kehaya v. Axton, 32 F. Supp. 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).
7LocAL CT. R., NEB. DisT. 28 (a).
4FED.
5
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will appear before the Clerk for taxation of the costs, and proof of
service of a copy upon the party liable for the costs, shall be endorsed thereon. The Clerk's action may be reviewed by the court
if motion to retax the costs is filed within five days after taxation
by the Clerk.

The statutory "bill of costs" referred to in the local rule is made
mandatory by the last sentence of 28 U.S.C. § 1920 which provides
that "A bill of costs shall be filed in the case and, upon allowance,
included in the judgment or decree."18
A particular form of verification is required by the provisions
of 28 U.S.C. § 1924:9
Before any bill of costs is taxed, the party claiming any item of
cost or disbursement shall attach thereto an affidavit, made by himself or by his duly authorized attorney or agent having knowledge
of the facts, that such item is correct and has been necessarily incurred in the case and that the services for which fees have been
charged were actually and necessarily performed.

The mechanics by which the statutory procedure is implemented in the District of Nebraska are essentially quite simple. Upon
the entry of a judgment which permits taxation of costs to the
prevailing party, the clerk of the court promptly forwards to counsel
for that party a sufficient number of printed Bill of Costs forms
(See appendix A) to permit filing of the original when prepared
and the service of a copy thereof upon opposing counsel. The form
contains blanks in which may be detailed the more prevalent items
of taxable costs, includes the statutory affidavit together with a
notice which may be used to set the bill for hearing, and includes
a certificate of service. In unusual cases it may be necessary to use
the form only as a guide for preparation of a more detailed bill of
costs pleading.
With the printed Bill of Costs form, the clerk also forwards
an informational statement showing those items of costs which have
been entered on the dockets during the course of the litigation (See
appendix B). This statement is supplied solely as a convenient
reference for counsel in his task of assembling the information
necessary for the preparation of a complete Bill of Costs. Under
no circumstances is this informational statement to be considered
as a request for payment of any item to the court. On the statement
will be found an itemization of known costs which have been incurred by each party, such as filing fees, marshal's service fees,
deposition fees (which have been endorsed on the file copies prior

828 U.S.C. § 1920 (1958).
928 U.S.C. § 1924 (1958).
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to filing), names of the witnesses who testified, and depositions
read at the trial. The statement will be far from complete as to
all costs taxable and allowable for the obvious reason that only
counsel will have at hand in his records the information pertaining to many items which may be recoverable, but which do not
appear of record; for example, the cost of preparing special exhibits,
miles traveled by witnesses, necessary days of attendance of witnesses, and costs incurred in obtaining certification of documents.
The original copy of the prepared Bill of Costs with its notice
of the time set for appearance before the clerk for taxation thereof
should, when completed, be filed with the clerk and a copy served
upon opposing counsel. Opposing counsel may then file and serve
written objections to the taxation of any or all items claimed, or he
may await the time set for taxation and then submit objections
orally or in writing or by both means. There is then devolved upon
the clerk the duty to make a determination of the costs allowable
and taxable.
At this point, however, it should be remembered that lest the
clerk be "carried away" by this one of his few opportunities to flee
from the role of an administrator and momentarily play the role
of a judge, there is adequate procedure available to dampen his
zeal. Counsel may quickly resort to the explicit provision of Rule
54(d) which states that: "On motion served within 5 days thereafter, the action of the clerk may be reviewed by the court."'1
Timely filing of the motion has been held to be jurisdictional."
If the trial court should be carried away in its final opportunity
to do "justice" between the parties, it appears that the normal
processes of appeal lie only if the issue presented is one of the
power of the court to act, as distinguished from the issue of an abuse
12
of discretion.
The costs which are finally allowed and taxed belong to the
prevailing party. They are payable directly to that party and not
through the office of the clerk. In the District
of Nebraska the pro3
cedure is specified by Local Rule 28 (b):
Unless otherwise ordered by the court, except in criminal cases,
suits for civil penalties for violations of criminal statutes, and Government cases not handled by the Department of Justice, all costs
10 Supra note 2.
"Delaware Valley Marine Supply Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 199 F. Supp.
560 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
12A.B.C. Packard Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 275 F.2d 63 (9th Cir. 1960);
Intertype Corp. v. Clark-Congress Corp., 249 F.2d 626 (7th Cir. 1957).
'3 Supra note 7.

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 42, NO. 4
taxed are payable directly to the party entitled thereto and not
to the Clerk.
The record, as to the fact of payment of the costs, is made by filing
a written "Satisfaction" therefor. 4
III. WHAT IS TAXABLE OR NON-TAXABLE
Five categories of taxable costs are defined in 28 U.S.C.A. §
1920.1 5 A glance at the multitude of annotations following the text
of this section and those following the text of Rule 54 reveals that
the brevity of the statutory definitions conceals a promiscuity
of controversy which has arisen from their interpretation. Only a
few salient points can be noted in each category.

A. FEEs OF Tm CLERK AND MARsHAL.
The amounts includable in this category are governed by the
provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1914 and 1917,16 which respectively fix
the filing fee for a civil proceeding at $15 and the fee for filing a
notice of appeal at $5; and, also, the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 19211'
which set forth the fees chargeable by marshals for various services rendered.
Some observations should be made concerning government
cases. Rule 54(d)18 provides that costs against the United States
shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law. But to be
simply aware that Congress, in particular classes of cases, has
waived the general immunity of the government from liability
for costs is not sufficient. Some of these special statutes, and the
interpretive decisions made thereunder, specifically limit the extent of costs made recoverable. An example in point is a taxpayer's
suit for refund of taxes paid. By the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §
2412 (b),119 costs may be allowed to the prevailing party in this type
of litigation if the United States puts in issue plaintiff's right to
recover. This statutory waiver of immunity, however, is specifically
restricted to those costs incurred from the time of the joining of
such issue, and it is further limited to costs actually incurred for
witnesses and for fees paid to the clerk. It has been held that
14See LOCAL

CT.

R.,

NEB. DIST. 27 dealing

judgments.

1528 U.S.C. § 1920 (1958).
1628 U.S.C. §§ 1914, 1917 (1958).
1728 U.S.C. § 1921 (1958).
18Fm. R. Civ. P. 54(d).
192 8 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (1958).

generally with satisfaction of
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under these restrictions the filing fee paid at the commencement
of the suit is not taxable,20 and that the attorney docket fee, which
21
will be discussed more fully later, is also not allowable.
B. FEES OF THE COURT REPORTER FOR

ALL OR ANY PART OF THE STENOGRAPHIC TRANSCRIPT NECESSARLY OBTAINED FOR USE IN THE CASE.

The cost of a transcript of the testimony obtained for purposes
of appeal may be allowed.2 2 The allowability of the cost of a transcript prepared in connection with the disposition of the case in
the trial court, however, has been the subject of considerable controversy. The determinative criteria is the court's need for the
transcript in resolving the issues of the case.23 The existence of
this circumstance depends largely upon the facts and complexities
of the particular controversy. 24 To be certain as to its taxability,
it is advisable to obtain a prior order directing preparation of the
transcript.25 In one reported case, however, the order was entered
nunc pro tunc,26 and on appeal it was held that the phrase "nunc
pro tunc" was of no significance because the trial court possessed
the power to make the order at the conclusion of the proceedings
as well as at the beginning. 27
The cost of Copies is generally not taxable; 28 nor is the cost of
daily copy procured solely for the convenience of counsel.29
The transcript of a pre-trial conference has been held to be
taxable where its availability was necessary for the preparation of
the pre-trial order, 0 and also where it was necessary to a proper
understanding of the matters covered at the conference.3 l
20United
21

States v. Mohr, 274 F.2d 803 (4th Cir. 1960).
Jensen v. United States, 185 F. Supp. 251 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).

22Knickerbocker

Plastic Co. v. Allied Molding Corp., 96 F. Supp. 358
(S.D.N.Y. 1949).
v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 24 F.R.D. 305 (D.Del. 1959).
24 Kowalewski
v. Pennsylvania R.R., 21 F.R.D. 244 (D.Del. 1957).
25Firtag
v. Gendleman, 152 F. Supp. 226 (D.D.C. 1957).
23 Prashker

26Anderson v. General Motors Corp., 161 F. Supp. 668 (W.D. Wash. 1958).

27A.B.C. Packard v. General Motors Corp., 275 F.2d 63 (9th Cir. 1960).
28

Kenyon v. Automatic Instrument Co., 10 F.R.D. 248 (W.D.Mich. 1950).

29Delaward Valley Marine Supply Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 199 F. Supp.

560 (E.D. Pa. 1960); Bennett Chemical Co. v. Atlantic Commodities, Ltd.,
24 F.R.D. 200 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
30
Bank of America v. Loew's Int'l Corp., 163 F. Supp. 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
3

'Brookside Theatre Corp. v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 11 F.R.D.

259 (W.D. Mo. 1951), aff'd & modified, 194 F.2d 846 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 343 U.S. 942 (1952).

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 42, NO. 4
Expenses incurred for transcripts of depositions come within
this category of taxable costs. 32 The fact that a deposition is not
received in evidence at the trial does not necessarily prevent taxation of its cost.3 3 So also, a deposition which receives only minimal
use as evidence at the trial may, nevertheless, be taxable if its taking can be shown to have been reasonably necessary to a party's
case in the light of a particular situation existing at the time of the
taking.34 However, the costs incurred for depositions taken exploratorily and merely for pre-trial preparation, or only for the benefit
and convenience of counsel in marshaling his case as distinguished
from a necessity for use in solution of the issues of the case, are
generally not allowable. 35
Extra copies of depositions obtained for the convenience of
counsel are not ordinarily taxable.36 In one case, however, the cost
was allowed after a showing that the copy was necessary in order
to hold an attempt at impeachment within proper limits;37 in another, where it was shown that the party taking the deposition
withheld filing of it until the day of trial, thus preventing prior
reference to the original by the prevailing party. 38

C.

FEES AND DISBURSEMENTS FOR PRINTING AND WITNESSES.

Printing costs are rarely involved in trial court proceedings
except to the extent that the ultimate total of costs recoverable
may be affected as the result of an appeal. Any allowance of costs
made to the prevailing party in the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit will be inserted in the mandate. 9 The allowance so made
32Cooke v. Universal Pictures Co., 135 F. Supp. 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Perlman v. Feldman, 116 F. Supp. 102 (D. Conn. 1953).
26.36 (2d ed. 1962).
34
Bank of America v. Loew's Int'l Corp., 163 F. Supp. 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
35
Bowman v. West Distrib. Co., 25 F.R.D. 280 (E.D.N.Y. 1960); Emerson v.
National Cylinder Gas Co., 147 F. Supp. 543 (D. Mass. 1957), afi'd, 251
F.2d 152 (1st Cir. 1958); Wagner v. Aetna Ins. Co., 16 F.R.D. 528 (D. Neb.
1954); Hansen v. Bradley, 114 F. Supp. 382 (D. Md. 1953); Andresen v.
Clear Ridge Aviation, 9 F.R.D. 50 (D. Neb. 1949); Burnham Chem. Co.
v. Borax Consol., 7 F.R.D. 341 (N.D. Cal. 1947); Republic Mach. Tool
Corp. v. Federal Cartridge Corp., 5 F.R.D. 388 (D. Minn. 1946).
36
General Cas. Co. v. Stanchfield, 23 F.R.D. 58 (D. Mont. 1959); Penner v.
Balfe Printing Corp., 21 F.R.D. 299 (D. Mass. 1958); Firtag v. Gendleman,
152 F. Supp. 226 (D.D.C. 1957); Ryan v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 18 F.R.D.
206 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Hope Basket Co. v. Product Advancement Corp., 104
F. Supp. 444 (W.D. Mich. 1952).
334 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE,

37
Hancock
38

v. Albee, 11 F.R.D. 139 (D. Conn. 1951).
Cooke v. Universal Pictures Co., 135 F. Supp. 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
39 8TH CIR. R. 17.
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may then be added to the costs recoverable in the trial court. Such
costs generally include the expense incurred for printing the record
on appeal but, contrary to a prevalent notion, they do not include
the cost of printing briefs.
Witness fees and allowances are fixed by the provisions of 28
U.S.C. § 1821 in substance as follows: 40 $4 for each day's attendance
and for the time necessarily occupied in going to and returning
from the place of attendance; $8 per day for expenses of subsistence,
including the time necessary for going to and returning from the
place of attendance, if the place of residence is so far removed as to
prohibit return thereto from day to day; and 8 cents per mile for
going from and returning to the place of residence.
Taxation may be made for the cost of each day the witness is
necessarily in attendance, and is not limited only to those costs
incurred for the actual day upon which the witness testified. 41 Fees
will be limited, however, to the days of actual testimony and the
days required for travel if no showing is made that the witness
necessarily attended for a longer time.4 These expenses are taxable
even though the witness attends voluntarily." The same is true
even though the witness is not actually called to testify if it can
be shown that the attendance was necessary; 44 but if a witness is not
used, the presumption is that his attendance was unnecessary. 45 An
order of the court or concessions made by a party in open court
during the course of the trial may make it unnecessary for the
opposing party to call to the stand some of those witnesses who
were in attendance, and in that case the presumption that witnesses
not testifying are unnecessarily called will likely be overcome. 46
An exception to the general rule for recovery of witness expenses is that a party to an action who testifies cannot tax fees and
allowances for himself.47 It appears, however, that stockholders,
directors, officers, and employees who testify on behalf of a corporate litigant may be treated with respect to witness fees and mileage
4028 U.S.C. § 1821 (1958).
4
lBennett Chem. Co. v. Atlantic Commodities, Ltd., 24 F.R.D. 200 (S.D.N.Y.
1959).
42
Commerce Oil Ref. Co. v. Miner, 198 F. Supp. 895 (D.R.I. 1961).

43Spiritwood Grain Co. v. Northern Pac. Ry., 179 F.2d 338 (8th Cir. 1960);
Gallagher v. Union Pac. Ry., 7 F.R.D. 208 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
44

Hansen v. Bradley, 114 F. Supp. 382 (D. Md. 1953).
5Clark v. Gifford-Hill & Co., 95 F. Supp. 975 (W.D. La. 1951).
46Mueller v. Powell, 115 F. Supp. 744 (W.D. Mo. 1953).
47
Ryan v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 18 F.R.D. 206 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Picking v.
Pennsylvania Ry., 11 F.R.D. 71 (M.D. Pa. 1951).
4
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the same as any other witness, so long as their interest in the litigation is no more than a natural concern for the welfare of the
corporation, as opposed to actual participation in litigation to an
extent that they become thus identifiable as parties in interest. 4 8
Of particular interest is the circumstance of a witness rdsiding
outside the territorial limits of the district. The general rule is
that mileage recoverable for such a witness is limited to 100
miles from the place of trial, which is the limit imposed by Rule
45(e) (1)49 for service of a subpoena outside the district unless a
statute provides otherwise. 50 Apparently, however, strict application of the rule is no longer universal. The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals has determined that mileage allowable should be that which
was traveled within the district, or actual mileage traveled in and
out of the district up to 100 miles, whichever is the greater. Thus,
mileage was allowed a non-resident witness from the point of
5
entering the district to the place of trial, a distance of 250 miles. '
In an absolute refusal to follow the rule, the District Court for
the Southern District of New York allowed recovery of the lowest
first-class rate of transportation ($783) for each of three witnesses
residing in England. The court simply observed that the limitation
imposed by the numerous prior decisions on the point was no
longer realistic.5 2 This departure was again confirmed in Bennett
Chemical Co. v. Atlantic Commodities, Ltd. 58 The Eastern District
of New York subsequently took the same position and allowed
$333.60 for transportation of a witness from Bogota, Columbia, and
$114.40 for transportation of a witness from Portland, Oregon. 54
Expenses incurred in the calling of expert witnesses are a
constant source of contention though the general principle applicable is that only the regular statutory fees and allowances. are
taxable.5 5 The actual fees and expenses paid to such witnesses are
48

Kemart Corp. v. Printing Arts Research Lab., 232 F.2d 897 (9th Cir.
1956); Perlman v. Feldmann, 116 F. Supp. 102 (D. Conn. 1953).
49 Fm. R. Civ. P. 45(e) (1).

5OSpirtwood Grain Co. v. Northern Pac. Ry., 179 F.2d 338 (8th Cir. 1950).;
Friedman v. Washburn Co., 155 F.2d 959 (7th Cir. 1946).

51Kemart

Corp. v. Printing Arts Research Lab., 232 F.2d 897 (9th Cir.

1956).
52Bank of America v. Loew's Int'l Corp., 163 F. Supp. 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).

5324 F.R.D. 200 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
54

Maresco v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, 167 F. Supp. 845 (E.D.N.Y.

1958).
5Kirby Lumber Corp. v. Louisiana, 293 F.2d 82 (5th Cir. 1961); Firtag v.

5

Gendleman, 152 F. Supp. 226 (D.D.C. 1957); Kenny v. United States, 118
F. Supp. 907 (D.N.J. 1954); Hansen v. Bradley, 114F. Supp. 382 (D. Md.
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allowable only in exceptional cases where dominating reasons of
justice compel the allowance. 56 Such
an allowance generally re57
quires a prior approval of the court.
D. FEES FOR EXEMPLIFICATION AND COPIES OF PAPERS NECESSARILY
OBTAINED FOR USE IN THE CASE.

This broad category encompasses the length and breadth of
exhibit evidence. From the mass of decisions it is difficult to
formulate specific rules for allowance or disallowance of costs
thus incurred. Each case must be viewed in the light of its own
peculiar problems of proof.
Generally speaking, it can be said that the cost of preparing
charts and drawings, the use of which are reasonably necessary to
facilitate a complete' understanding of the issues of the case, are
allowable. 8 Those maps and charts which do more than illustrate
the "witness' testimony, and are themselves of vital importance to
a correct determination of the issues, clearly meet the requirement
for taxability; 59 as do those maps and photographs which are themselves received as evidence of facts.60
Contrarily, the expense of obtaining charts, models, photographs, and sound movies which are not indispensable to development of the case or are not essential61to decision of the issues may
not be taxed as costs of the litigation.
Fees paid for exemplifications and copies of file wrappers in
1953); Banks v. Chicago Mill & Lumber Co., 106 F. Supp. 234 (E.D. Ark.
1950).
H6Andresen v. Clear ,Ridge Aviation, 9 F.R.D. 50 (D. Neb. 1949); Swan
Carburetor Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 55 F. Supp. 794 (E.D. Mich. 1944),
affd in part, 149 F.2d 476 (6th Cir. 1945).
,57Department of Highways v. McWilliams Dredging Co., 10 F.R.D. 107
(W.D. La. 1951), affd, 187 F.2d 61 (5th Cir. 1951); Brookside Theatre
Corp. v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 11 F.R.D. 259 (W.D. Mo.
1951).

58Swan

Carburetor Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 149 F.2d 476 (6th Cir. 1945);
Hope Basket Co. v. Product Advancement Corp., 104 F. Supp. 444 (W.D.
Mich. 1952); Kenyon v. Automatic Instrument Co., 10 F.R.D. 248 (W.D.
Mich. 1950).
59 Freedman v. Philadelphia
Terminals Auction Co., 198 F. Supp. 429
(E.D. Pa. 1961); Banks v. Chicago Mill & Lumber Co., 106 F. Supp. 234
(E.D. Ark. 1950).
GOStachon v. Hoxie, 190 F. Supp. 185 (W.D. Mich. 1960).
OlDepartment of Highways v. McWilliams Dredging Co., 10 F.R.D. 107
(W.D. La.), aff'd in part, 187 F.2d 61 (5th Cir. 1951); Prashker v. Beech
Aircraft Corp., 24 F.R.D. 305 (D. Del. 1959); Andresen v. Clear Ridge
Aviation, 9 F.R.D. 50 (D. Neb. 1949).
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patent infringement cases are allowable, 62 but the cost of the
construction of expensive models is not ordinarily recoverable
unless previously authorized by order of the court. 68
The cost of photostatic copies of documents necessarily obtained
for use in the case may be taxable, 64 and the cost of securing translations necessary for exemplification of matters before the court
can also be recovered.05

E. DOCKET

FEES UNDER SECTION

1923 OF THIS TITLE.

67
In part, 28 U.S.C. § 1923 (a) 66 provides:
Attorney's and proctor's docket fees in courts of the United States
may be taxed as costs as follows:
"$20 on trial or final hearing (including a default judgment
whether entered by the court or by the clerk) in civil, criminal,
or admiralty cases.... ;
"$5 on discontinuance of a civil action;
"$5 on motion for judgment and other proceedings on recognizances;
"$2.50 for each deposition admitted in evidence.
This item of costs is what is commonly known as the "Attorney's
Docket Fee." Though seemingly archaic to twentieth century litigation it is, nevertheless, a statutory "bonanza" to which the prevailing party is entitled. Probably because of its paucity, more than
a few attorneys take the position that they know not of what is
an attorney's docket fee or why or when it is taxable; and, seemingly yielding to a course of least resistance, they carefully include
in the judgment (with this clerk's blessing and encouragement) the
recital "attorney's docket fee waived."
Simply stated, however, the provisions of this sub-section
merely entitle the prevailing party to recover as costs an attorney's
fee of $20 if trial or final hearing is had or judgment entered, $5 if
an action is otherwise discontinued, $5 for proceedings on recognizances, and $2.50 for each deposition admitted in evidence. The
application of the statute is not always so simple.
62

Criner v. Micro-Westco Inc., 3 F.R.D. 495 (S.D. Iowa 1944).
Special Equip. & Mach. Corp. v. Zell Motor Car Co., 193 F.2d 515 (4th Cir.
1952); Gotz v. Universal Prods. Co., 3 F.R.D. 153 (D. Del. 1943); Goodrich v. Ford Motor Co., 55 F. Supp. 792 (E.D. Mich. 1940)
64
Anderson v. General Motors Corp., 161 F. Supp. 668 (W.D. Wash. 1958);
65 Burnham Chem. Co. v. Borax Consol., Ltd., 7 F.R.D. 341 (N.D. Cal. 1947).
Bennett Chem. Co. v. Atlantic Commodities, Ltd., 24 F.R.D. 200 (S.D.N.Y.
1958); Gotz v. Universal Prods. Co., 3 F.R.D. 153 (D. Del. 1943).
6628 U.S.C. § 1923(a) (1958).
67
Other portions of the section pertain to graduated fees applicable in
admiralty matters which, because of their understandable lack of prevalence in the Nebraska District, are not relevant to this discussion.
63
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If there are two prevailing parties and each has employed
separate counsel, is each party entitled to a $20 attorney's docket
fee upon entry of judgment, or can only one fee be taxed in one
case which the prevailing parties must then divide? No court
decision seems to answer this question, and probably the best disposition is an observation that the sum involved is not sufficiently
large to warrant more than an awareness that this is a demonstration of the anomalous character of the item in present day litigation.
Then too, if a plaintiff sues two alleged joint tortfeasors and
recovers verdict and judgment against one, but the other secures
verdict and judgment of dismissal, is not the plaintiff entitled
to recover an attorney's docket fee of $20 against one defendant,
while the other defendant is likewise entitled to a fee of $20 as
against the plaintiff? The answer to this question is probably in
the affirmative.
Only brief reference need be made to the $2.50 attorney docket
fee allowed for each deposition admitted in evidence. Ordinarily
this item is taxable for every deposition read in whole or in part
at the trial,68 and is not taxable for any deposition not so used. 9
At this point it is appropriate to note the general rule that
attorney's fees, other than the docket fees authorized by section
1923, are not taxable as costs in the absence of express statutory
authority therefor ° Examples of statutory provisions permitting
the taxation of attorney fees as costs are patent cases, 71 where the
allowance is discretionary; and suits brought pursuant to provisions
of the Clayton Act,72 where taxation appears to be a matter of right.
Attorney' fees made recoverable by Nebraska law73 in suits upon
policies of insurance are said not to be costs taxable within the
meaning of the federal statutes, but the same result is obtained
by holding that they are includable as an integral part of the
recoverable judgment.7 4 Moreover, such fees are not considered
to be costs within the exclusion of the jurisdictional statutes,7 , so
08Perlman

v. Feldman, 116 F. Supp. 102 (D. Conn. 1953).

9

Prashker v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 24 F.R.D. 305 (D. Del. 1959).
7
OKenny v. United States, 118 F. Supp. 907 (D.N.J. 1954).
7135 U.S.C. § 285 (1958).
7238 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958).
73
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 44-359, -381 (Reissue 1960).
,

4

Sioux County v. National Sur. Co., 276 U.S. 238 (1928); Baldwin v. Hart-

ford Ace. & Indem. Co., 168 F. Supp. 86 (D. Neb.), aff'd, 262 F.2d
202 (8th Cir. 1958).
7528 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441 (1958).
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that in determining the required minimal 7amount
in controversy
6
they are to be added to the principal claim.

A particular exception to the general rule against taxation of
attorney's fees should be observed; namely, the inherent power of
an equity court to tax attorney's fees against the losing party in
exceptional cases where such taxation is essential to the doing of
justice and
there exists no express statutory prohibition to the
77
contrary.
Consistent with the general rule are holdings that there
is no authority for allowance of attorney's fees and other expenses
incurred by reason of the taking of depositions at a distant place.j8
Pursuant to a local rule empowering the court to order payment
of counsel fees and other expenses where a party proposes to take a
deposition at a distance more than 150 miles from the courthouse,
taxation has been made for attorney's fees thus incurred. 9 Even
absent a local rule governing the situation, it would seem that the
last sentence of Federal Rule 30(b),80 relating to orders for the
protection of parties and deponents and providing that "the court
may make any other order which justice requires to protect
the party or witness from annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression," is sufficiently broad to permit the court in a proper case and
upon proper showing to make a prior order requiring payment of
reasonable expenses incurred in the taking of a deposition at a
distant place.
IV. OTHER COSTS.
It has been said that "the allowance or disallowance of items
of costs is determined by statute, rule, order, usage, and practice
of the instant court."8' Accordingly, section 1920 is not necessarily
the ultimate limit on all allowable costs.
Most of the reported cases which have dealt with extraordinary
costs, other than those cited in the foregoing discussion of particular
topics, have been concerned with the question of allowability of
7

6Missouri State Life Ins. Co. v. Jones, 290 U.S. 199 (1933); Mutual Benefit
Health & Acc. Ass'n v. Bowman, 96 F.2d 7 (8th Cir. 1938).
77
Rolax v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 186 F.2d 473 (4th Cir. 1951); Taussig
v. Wellington Fund, Inc., 187 F. Supp. 179 (D. Del. 1960).
78
Anderson v. General Motors Corp., 161 F. Supp. 668 (W.D. Wash. 1958);
Hope Basket Co. v. Product Advancement Corp., 104 F. Supp. 444 (W.D.
Mich. 1952).
79
Ryan v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 18 F.R.D. 206 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
80
FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b).
81
Kemart Corp. v. Printing Arts Research Lab., 232 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1956).
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premiums paid for various types of bonds filed responsive to requirements of particular statutes or local rules.
82
In the case of Swalley v. Addressograph-Multigraph Corp.,
the premium paid on a supersedeas bond was taxed as costs pursuant
to a rule of the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
providing that "the reasonable premiums or expense paid on
all bonds or stipulations or other security given . . . shall be

taxed as a part of the costs of that party."
In Department of Highways v. McWilliams Dredging Co., 3 the
premium paid on a removal bond was allowed by the District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana as a necessary cost of litigation even though no local rule specifically covered the matter; and
the allowance was affirmed on appeal. 4 Also, in Bennett Chemical
Co. v. Atlantic Commodities, Ltd.,8 5 the premium paid on a nonresident cost bond was held by the District Court for the Southern
District of New York to be a proper subject for taxation as costs.
No further reasons were stated therefor, and no reference was made
to any local rule as determinative of the question.
One other case allowing this item of costs bears comment. In re
Northern Indiana Oil Co. 86 involved a supersedeas bond premium

of $1,636.00 which was taxed by the District Court for the Northern
District of Indiana. The fact that there was no local rule so authorizing the allowance was noted. This was a bankruptcy matter,
however, and the court relied upon the power inherent in its
exercise of equity jurisdiction to do complete justice between the
parties.
To the contrary is the case of Nash v. Raun,87 in the Western
District of Pennsylvania, which held that a premium of $412.50
paid on an appeal bond was not taxable in the absence of a court
rule so authorizing the taxation; and, also, the case of Webster
Motor Car Co. v. Packard Motor Car Co.,8 8 where a supersedeas
bond premium was disallowed because no local rule or decision of
the District Court for the District of Columbia permitted it. The
court made the further specific observation that usage in the
district had been continually not to allow such an item to be taxed.
82168 F.2d 585 (7th Cir. 1948).
83 10 F.R.D. 107 (W.D. La. 1950), aff'd, 187 F.2d 61 (5th Cir. 1951).

84187 F.2d 61 (5th Cir. 1951).
8524 F.R.D. 200 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
86192 F.2d 139 (7th Cir. 1951).
8767 F. Supp. 212 (W.D. Pa. 1946).
88168 F. Supp. 660 (D.D.C. 1958).
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It should be noted that no local rule authorizing the taxation of
bond premiums exists in the District of Nebraska and it appears
that custom and usage has been not to allow recovery of the item.
Finally, the most practical observation which can be made
about the incurrence of extraordinary costs is a reference to the
admonition by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Euler v.
Waller: 9 "[Wihen costs are sought for items not listed in section
1930 the procedure to be followed is an application to the court in
advance of trial for an approving order."
V. COSTS IN CRIMINAL CASES.
By the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1918 (b) 90 the court may order
the defendant upon conviction to pay the costs of prosecution for
any offense not capital. If the court does order payment of costs,
all items previously discussed are apparently taxable with the
exception of the clerk's filing fee. By the provisions of 28 U.S.C.
§ 191491 this fee is limited to civil proceedings. However, in proceedings for the violation of an Act of Congress in which a civil fine
or forfeiture of property is provided for, the direction of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1918 (a) 92 is that: "Costs shall be included in any judgment, order,
or decree .... " (Emphasis added.)
CONCLUSION
The foregoing is by no means an exhaustive analysis of all
reported cases touching upon the multitudinous questions which
have arisen in proceedings to tax costs. Some attempt has been
made to limit citations to representative cases, but in nearly every
opinion so cited there will be found an involvement with several
items of costs in addition to that for which citation is made. Thus
the reader should be led to a wealth of authority on the various
facets of the subject.
Some of the decisions may appear to present inconsistencies, but
this is more apparent than real. It must always be remembered that
in making a determination as to allowance or disallowance of most
items of costs, there lies with the court a considerable range of
discretion. A uniform result is, therefore, not always the end
product.
89295 F.2d 765 (10th Cir. 1961).

9028 U.S.C. § 1918(b) (1958).
9128 U.S.C. § 1914 (1958).
9228 U.S.C. § 1918(a) (1958).
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APPENDIX A
(Facsimile of Form A.O. 133 Rev. 1-1-52)

Bill of Costs
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the
DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA
RICHARD ROE,

ABC CORPORATION,I

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil Action File No. 1234

Defendant.

Judgment having been entered in the above entitled action on
the 5th day of March, 1963, against ABC Corporation the clerk is
requested to tax the following as costs:
BILL OF COSTS
Fees of the clerk
Fees of the marshal
Fees of the court reporter for all or any part of the
transcript necessarily obtained for use in the case
Fees and disbursements for printing
Fees for witnesses (itemized on reverse side)
Fees for exemplification and copies of papers
necessarily obtained for use in case
Docket fees under 28 U. S. C. 1923
Costs incident to taking of depositions
Costs as shown on Mandate of Court of Appeals

$

15.00
22.50
250.00
232.00
25.00
27.50
135.00
257.50

Other Costs (Please itemize)

Cost of constructing model of patented device
as per Order of the Court
Attorney's fees allowed as per Order of Court
Total

300.00
1,000.00
$2,264.50

State of Nebraska
ss:
County of Douglas
I, John Advocate do hereby swear that the foregoing costs are
correct and were necessarily incurred in this action and that the
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services for which fees have been charged were actually and necessarily performed. A copy hereof was this day mailed to Frederick
Counselor, attorney for defendant, with postage fully prepaid
thereon.
Please take notice that I will appear before the Clerk to tax said
costs on the 25th day of March, 1963 at Omaha, Nebraska.

Is/
Attorney for

John Advocate
Plaintiff

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 16th day of March A. D. 1963
at Omaha, Nebraska
/s/ Mary Oath
Notary Public.
Costs are hereby taxed in the amount of $2,264.50 this 25th
day of March, 1963, and that amount included in the judgment.

Is/

John Procedure
Clerk.

By
Deputy Clerk.
REVERSE SIDE
Wiiness Fees (computation, cf. 28 U. S. C. 1821 for statutory fees)
Name and Residence

Robert Gray
Wm. White
Paul Day
Ralph Night
Richard Swing
Sam Steer
Mae Float
Sue Rock
R. Smith (at deposition
taking)
Mary Smith (at deposition
taking)
Ruth Jones (at deposition
taking)

Attendance

Total
Cost

Subsistence

Days

Days

Total
Cost

2
2
2
1
1
3
1
1

8.00
8.00
8.00
4.00
4.00
12.00
4.00
4.00

2
2
2

16.00
16.00
16.00

3

24.00

1

4.00

30

2.40

6.40

1

4.00

30

2.40

6.40

1

4.00

10
Total

.80

4.80
$232.00

1

Mileage
Miles

Total
Cost

200 16.00
200 16.00
200 16.00
100
8.00
50 4.00
300 24.00
30 2.40
50 4.00

Total Cost
Each
Witness

$40.00
40.00
40.00
12.00
8.00
60.00
6.40
8.00
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NOTICE
Section 1924, Title 28, U. S. Code (effective September 1, 1948)
provides:
"Sec. 1924. Verification of bill of costs.
"Before any bill of costs is taxed, the party claiming any item
of cost or disbursement shall attach thereto an affidavit, made by
himself or by his duly authorized attorney or agent having knowledge of the facts, that such item is correct and has been necessarily
incurred in the case and that the services for which fees have been
charged were actually and necessarily performed."
See also Section 1920 of Title 28 which reads in part as follows:
"A bill of costs shall be filed in the case and, upon allowance,
included in the judgment or decree."
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contain the following provisions:
Rule 54 (d)
"Except when express provision therefor is made either in a
statute of the United States or in these rules, costs shall be allowed
as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise
directs; but costs against the United States, its officers, and agencies
shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law. Costs may be
taxed by the clerk on one day's notice. On motion served within 5
days thereafter, the action of the clerk may be reviewed by the
court."
Rule 6 (e)
"Whenever a party has the right or is required to do some act
or take some proceedings within a prescribed period after the service of a notice or other paper upon him and the notice or paper is
served upon him by mail, 3 days shall be added to the prescribed
period."
Rule 58 (In Part)
"The entry of the judgment shall not be delayed for the taxing
of costs."
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APPENDIX B
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
for the
DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA
Case No. 1234
RICHARD ROE,
Plaintiff,
Statement of Costs
vs.
ABC CORPORATION, Defendant.
March 15

1963

To assist you in disposing of the item of costs the following is
supplied as appearing of record on this date. Costs are due directly
to the party awarded costs, and to release the judgment for costs
a Satisfaction should be filed. No remittance is to be made to the
Clerk except in criminal cases, bond forfeitures in criminal matters,
and Government cases not handled by the U. S. Attorney's office.
Nature of Fee or Costs

Clerk's Fees
Marshal's Fees
Sheriff's Fees
Fees Under 28 USC 1923:
Attorney Docket Fee
Reading Depositions
Costs From Mandate of
Court of Appeals
Deposition Costs

For Plaintiff

I For Defendant

15.00
22.50

$ 7.50

20.00
7.50

5.00

257.50
R. Smith (Costs
not shown)
Mary Smith 55.00
Ruth Jones 35.00

John Doe
R. Black
Richard Roe

62.50
27.50
50.00

Witnesses Sworn:
(See 28 USC 1821 for
fees and allowances)
Robert Gray
Win. White
Paul Day
Ralph Night
Richard Swing
Sam Steer
Mae Float
Sue Rock

Joe Block
Earnest Easy
Clyde Glibb
Ann Hearsay
Morris Irrelevant

